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On Jan. 1, 1995 the placards on the front of the large building on the shore
of Lake Geneva were changed from GATT to WTO - World Trade
Organization. On this date, a new organization came into being for the
purposes of assisting governments in the world to better manage problems
of international economic interdependence. This event occurred 50 years
after the establishment of the Bretton Woods System (with the World Bank
and IMF Charters), and almost 50 years after the establishment of the
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the failure of the ITO
Charter (International Trade Organization), which would have been the
institution to complete the Bretton Woods system.
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The WTO was one of the major
results of the extended Uruguay Round
negotiations on trade, under the auspices
of GAIT. The Uruguay Round was the
eighth major trade negotiating round of
GAIT, and had been underway since
September 1986. This was a massive
undertaking, resulting in a final Act
signed at Marrakesh, Morocco, on
April 15, 1994, consisting of 26,000
pages (undoubtedly a record for a treaty
length). The length of time for the
negotiation as well as the number of
pages indicate the enormous complexity
of the endeavor which had been
undertaken. Although most of these
pages are detailed schedules of tariff and
service obligations, nevertheless about
1,000 pages of carefully negotiated treaty
text covers subjects such as tariffs,
financial services, intellectual property,
antidumping measures, escape clause and
safeguard measures, textile trade,
agricultural trade, and many more crucial
questions of international economics. But
perhaps the most significant measure
included in the Marrakesh Final Act was
the new "Charter" for a "World Trade
Organization," which would now replace
the GAIT as the central institution for
international trade cooperation in the
world today
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1. A Bit of History:
Gatt and Its Birth Defects
It is common knowledge that the
GAIT itself was never intended to be an
organization. Rather, after the other
Bretton Woods institutions were
established (in 1945), world government
leaders determined that it would be
necessary to add another institution, one
devoted to trade - an "ITO - International
Trade Organization." The GAIT was
merely designed to be a multilateral trade
and tariff agreement which would depend
on the ITO for its institutional
infrastructure. When the ITO did not
come into force because parliaments,
particularly the U.S. Congress, would not
approve it in the late 1940s, the GAIT
gradually became the central focus of
coordinating activity among nations
regarding trade.
Despite this inauspicious beginning,
the GAIT has been remarkably successful
during its nearly five decades of history
Partly this is because of ingenious and

pragmatic leadership, particularly in its
early years. Nevertheless, because of this
unfortunate history, the GAIT had
endured a number of "birth defects"
which proved increasingly troublesome in
recent years as world economic affairs
became more complex and harder to
manage. These defects include:
• Provisional application and
grandfather rights exceptions
embraced by the Protocol of
Provisional Application.
• Ambiguity about the powers of the
contracting parties to make certain
decisions.
• Ambiguity regarding the waiver
authority and risks of misuse.
• Murky legal status leading to
misunderstanding by the public,
media, and even government officials.
• Certain defects in the dispute
settlement procedures.
• Lack of institutional provisions
generally, so constant improvisation
was necessary

2. The New "Charter":
A World Trade Organization
Although not originally included in
the Uruguay Round agenda, the idea to
develop a new organization began to take
form in 1990, partly as the need for a
better institutional mechanism for
implementing the Uruguay Round
became apparent. The notion of a new
organization charter would essentially
continue the GAIT institutional ideas in
many of its practices but would correct
some of the "birth defects;" improve the

institutional structure so that it would be
better understood by the public, media,
government officials and lawyers; and
extend the new organizational structure
to some of the new subjects taken up in
the Uruguay Round for the first time,
such as trade in services and intellectual
property.
The structure of the WTO agreement
includes the "Charter" itself, and a series
of Annexes. The contents of these
Annexes are the detailed substantive
obligations undertaken as a result of the
Uruguay Round negotiation. These
include the entire text of the GAIT, as
changed through the years and
embellished by certain "side-agreements"
derived from texts negotiated in the
Tokyo Round of the 1970s, and improved
in the Uruguay Round. The new
Agreements on Services Trade and
Intellectual Property also became part of
the Annexes of the Charter.
There are many achievements as a
result of the Uruguay Round, but with
respect to the institutional achievements,
the Charter, and the new rules for dispute
settlement, are the most important.

3. The New Rules for Dispute Settlement
in the World Trading System
One of the many achievements of the
GAIT, despite its "birth defects," had
been the development of a reasonably
sophisticated dispute settlement process.
The original GAIT Treaty contained very
little text covering this process, but as
time went on, practice evolved towards a
"rule-oriented" system, with panels of
experts making findings in dispute cases.
During the last several decades in
particular, the contracting parties of
GAIT utilized the procedure more and
more. The number of cases and the
number of these reports is several times
the number of cases in the World Court
(ICE - International Court of Justice).
Indeed, by the late 1980s many
governments and world leaders
considered the dispute settlement
procedure to be the centerpiece of the
GAIT.

4. WTO Decisions and the
"Sovereignty" Problem

The dispute process, however, suffered
from some important defects derived
from the larger context of the GAIT
"birth defects." Most significant was the
practice that had developed by which a
panel report must be adopted by the
GAIT Council before it became binding.
The Council acted by consensus in these
cases, which gave any contracting party
the right to block the adoption. Thus the
losing party under a panel report could
block its adoption and argue that the
panel report was not binding on it. One
of the important goals of the Uruguay
Round negotiation was to resolve this
problem, and under the new Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), the
new rules prevent blocking. Thus panel
reports will be virtually automatically
brought into force. This result, however,
was not acceptable without some
additional procedural measures. Most
particularly, the Uruguay Round
negotiators decided that the quid pro quo
for automatic adoption was a right to
appeal from a panel opinion. An appeal
can now be taken to an appellate body
established under the WTO. This
appellate body consists of a permanent
roster of seven individuals who serve for
four-year terms on a rotating basis. When
an appeal is lodged, three persons from
that roster will be selected to be the
appellate panel which will examine the
appeal. The result of the appellate
deliberations is an appellate report and
findings, which also will not be subject to
blocking. This is an extraordinary step
under international law, and virtually
unique in international dispute settlement
procedures.

One of the difficult negotiating
problems faced by governments in the
Uruguay Round as they formulated the
new trade constitution was the worry
often generally and ambiguously
expressed as "encroachment on national
sovereignty." In particular, there was a
worry that the WTO as an organization
could make decisions that would impose
new binding obligations on governments
without their consent, in the context of a
one-nation one-vote, majority vote
system. The problem was most acutely
felt by the large and powerful economic
entities who clearly would not accept an
institutional structure which would give
rise to the possibility of large numbers of
"mini-states" outvoting a major economic
power. Under the GATT, there was always
a risk of this occurring because the GAIT
was relatively weak as an institution.
Thus some of its rather brief clauses
were never designed to establish an
organization, and were quite ambiguous.
Under the WTO "Charter," however, the
diplomats worked to provide checks and
balances on the various decision-making
procedures. Thus, certain types of actions
require a super majority (such as threefourths of the membership). Procedures
for amending the charter are particularly
intricate, with a number of fall-back
measures to protect members against
being outvoted on at least important
questions.

5. The First Year Stresses on the System
The new organization, as of this
writing, has now been in operation for
slightly more than a year. There are
more than 110 members. The processes
(during 1994) of ratifying and
implementing the Uruguay Round Treaty
results were extraordinarily involved and
occasioned very large debates, at least in
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some countries (such as the United
States). Yet, almost miraculously, the
major participants completed their
ratification decisions by the end of 1994,
so that the organization could be formally
established onJan. l, 1995.
During the first year of its operation
the organization has faced several stresses.
Yet in each of these, the organization has
overcome the problem successfully. The
first such stress was the selection of a
Director-General. This caused a
considerable amount of diplomatic
footwork, but in the end, and almost
inevitably, the current Director-General
(Renato Ruggiero) was selected.
A second stress was the announcement
by the United States of its intention to
apply tariff increases on luxury
automobiles imported from Japan if the
Japanese did not satisfy certain U.S. trade
demands. The threat involved action that
would have been a clear violation by the
U.S. of its obligations under the WTO.
This was extraordinarily unfortunate,
giving the impression that the largest
economic power in the world was
suggesting within a half year of accepting
the massive Uruguay Round treaty
obligations that it was prepared to deviate
from those obligations upon its own
initiative, without any reasonable
justiHcation. Fortunately, the disputing
parties (the U.S. and Japan), after various
threats and cross-threats of bringing a
WTO dispute settlement procedure,
settled their case. Indeed, the result of
this may have been to strengthen the
WTO system, because at least to careful
observers it appeared that the U.S.
backed down from its threat.
Finally, during a good part of 1995,
the leadership of the organization strove
to develop the necessary consensus to
appoint the seven appellate body roster
members. This occasioned a large amount
of diplomatic interchange and concern,
but by December the list of seven names
for the roster was formally approved, and
these persons were sworn in at the
Geneva WTO Headquarters on Dec. 13,
1995.
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All in all, it appears that the first year
of the WTO has been reasonably
successful. Clearly there are clouds on the
horizon that could bring some stormy
weather in the future, but that is to be
expected for an organization that is
already playing an extraordinary central
role in international economic diplomacy.

6. Future Prospects and Perspectives
Almost any reflective consideration of
the rapidly increasing international
economic interdependence leads to
recommendations for increasing
in_ternational cooperation in order to cope
with the problems that interdependence
is thrusting upon us. No longer can
nations effectively implement their
national economic regulations (ranging
from interest rates to prudential banking
measures, to fairness in the stock
markets, even to labor standards) because
too often there are international
constraints and implications related to
almost any national measure, even those
of the largest economies. Some policy
makers at least have realized this.
However, the more one turns to
international cooperation institutions, the
more it begins to be clear that attention
must be paid to the "constitution" of
these international institutions, just as
extensive attention is given to national
level "constitutions."
This raises issues about governance,
such as preventing abuse of power,
effectively channeling important
information to decision makers, giving
constituencies the opportunity to be
heard and to have weight of influence on
the decision making processes. These
concepts inevitably lead to questions
about the appropriate distribution of
power over economic affairs in the world
and the degree to which power should b~
located in an international institution or
a national/[ederal institution, or in subfederal or even very local governmental
units. The word "subsidiarity" is
sometimes used to describe these general
concepts of distribution of power, and the
opposing goals of urging government
decisions to be made at the lowest level
possible so as to be close to constituents

that are affected, but on the other hand to
empower higher levels of government to
take measures that can be effectively
implemented by appropriate measures at
such higher level.
The WTO as an institution continues
to require attention, including attention
to problems such as the following:
• First, an important question is
whether the new dispute settlement
procedures will work effectively. There
will indeed be temptations of some
member nations, probably the largest, to
ignore or undermine the results of
dispute settlement procedures when
those procedures are not entirely
satisfactory to the member concerned.
Obviously, if too much of that approach
occurs the dispute settlement procedure
will begin to lack credibility, and thus will
fail in its primary purpose of establishing
and maintaining a creditable ruleoriented system.
• Second, the decision-making and
voting procedures of the WTO, although
much improved over the GAIT, still leave
much to be desired. It is not clear how
the consensus practice will proceed,
particularly given the large number of
countries now or soon involved. It may
be necessary at some point to develop
certain practices about voting to constrain
misuse of the various voting rules.
• Third, with a likelihood of well over
120 nation members, the WTO must
soon face up to its internal procedures for
effective governance and administration.
This suggests the need for some sort of
small steering group to guide and advise
the Director-General, and other officers of
the WTO, in developing priorities for
agenda and secretariat work, as well as
initiatives to meet new problems in the
world. The question of such a steering
group has been controversial in the past;
every country that suspects it would not
be a member of such a group tends to
oppose its establishment. However,
without such a group, informal
mechanisms arise that may be even more
exclusive and biased to certain types of
economic structures than would

otherwise be desired by the membership.
For example, the "quad" group consisting
of the U.S., the EU (European Union),
Japan and Canada, has been very
influential in the GAIT system. Surely
that influence will continue, but the
question is if those four governments
will be joined by a broader group of
representative governments while still
maintaining a number small enough to be
an effective guiding mechanism for the
WTO.
• Fourth, an important institutional
problem will be how to integrate into the
WTO new or emerging subjects which
arise in the future, such as the problem of
environment and trade rules. The
amending rules of the WTO may (as they
did in GATT) turn out to be too rigid and
difficult to fulfill. If that is the case how
will new subjects be integrated int~ the
system? As mentioned above, it may be
that new "plurilateral agreements" under
Annex 4 will be a major device for this,
but the more that occurs, the more we
will go back to the old GAIT difficulty of
"a la carte" choices.
• Fifth, there is the broad and important
issue of enhancing the public
understanding of the WTO and its work.
This leads to the subject of
"transparency," commonly understood to
mean adequate information and openness
of the procedures, advocacy, meetings,
etc., so that the media and scholarly
endeavors can assist in informing the
world public about the operation of the
WTO, which can have such an important
influence on the lives and welfare of
people.
• Sixth, there has already been much
comment about the "agenda" after the
Uruguay Round for the World Trading
System. One question often raised is
whether there should be another "round "
or whether the procedures for pursuing '
future subjects should try to avoid rounds
which tend to be so complicated and
cumbersome. The arguments in favor of
rounds, however, may still prevail,
namely that a larger round gives more
opportunity for trade-off between
different subjects, and raises the issues to

the highest level of national governments
where definitive decisions can usually be
made (whereas lower level officials and
technicians would not be able to make
such compromises).
Without necessarily providing a
complete inventory of substantive issues
to be faced in the future by the
organization (in addition to the so-called
"left over issues" mention above), the
following seem to be appropriately
included on most lists:
1. A series of subjects, already newly
facing the organization:
• Competition policy in relation
to trade rules.
• Non-market economies, state trading,
and economies in transition and their
relation to the trading rules (e.g.,
China, Russia, etc.).
• Product (and service) standards and
the use of science, raising questions of
harmonization or other techniques of
facilitating trade flows.
• Cultural, social policy, and
structural impediments to trade.
2. There are also a series of subjects that
we could call "link issues," which are
subjects that are often separately
considered, but which have important
interlinkages with trade. These include:
• Environmental rules and trade policy:
• Labor standards and rules of
trade policy:
• Human rights and trade policy
(including economic sanctions).
• Monetary policy and its relation to
trade policy:
• Arms control and non-proliferation
issues and their relation to trade policy:
3. Apart from these subjects for a postUruguay Round agenda, there are certain
basic GAIT concepts that need to be
reconsidered and possibly altered so that
they will be more effective in the future
economically interdependent world.
These include:
• The most-favored-nation clause
(and problems of the free rider).
• Regionalism and its relation to the
multilateral system.
• Reciprocity and whether this concept
can effectively handle the problems of
rule making.

• National treatment and the need for
minimum standards that go beyond
non-discrimination or "equal"
treatment.
• Antidumping rules (as previously
mentioned) and the question of
whether these rules are in reality
safeguards or escape clause measures,
rather than unfair trade measures.
In short, we have put in place an
evolutionary watershed structure of
institution and rules to round out the
international economic system, but any
close look quickly reveals that there is
much more to do.
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